Tuesday, January 17, 2012

The Narcissism Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement [Paperback] Jean M. Twenge (Author), W. Keith Campbell (Author)

Book Description

April 13, 2010
Narcissism—an inflated view of the self—is everywhere. Public figures say it’s what makes them stray from their wives. Parents teach it by dressing children in T-shirts that say "Princess." Teenagers and young adults hone it on Facebook, and celebrity newsmakers have elevated it to an art form. And it’s what’s making people depressed, lonely, and buried under piles of debt.

Jean Twenge’s influential first book, Generation Me, spurred a national debate with its depiction of the challenges twenty- and thirty-somethings face in today’s world—and the fallout these issues create for educators and employers. Now, Dr. Twenge turns her focus to the pernicious spread of narcissism in today’s culture, which has repercussions for every age group and class. Dr. Twenge joins forces with W. Keith Campbell, Ph.D., a nationally recognized expert on narcissism, to explore this new plague in The Narcissism Epidemic, their eye-opening exposition of the alarming rise of narcissism and its catastrophic effects at every level of society. Even the world economy has been damaged by risky, unrealistic overconfidence. Drawing on their own extensive research as well as decades of other experts’ studies, Drs. Twenge and Campbell show us how to identify narcissism, minimize the forces that sustain and transmit it, and treat it or manage it where we find it. Filled with arresting, alarming, and even amusing stories of vanity gone off the tracks (would you like to hire your own personal paparazzi?), The Narcissism Epidemic is at once a riveting window into the consequences of narcissism, a prescription to combat the widespread problems it causes, and a probing analysis of the culture at large.

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Editorial Reviews

From Booklist

Twenge and Campbell, psychologists and authors of previous books on self-admiration, team up for a thorough look at a troubling trend that has broad cultural implications. They begin by chronicling changes in American culture that have brought us Botox, fake paparazzi, and MySpace. The authors distinguish between self-esteem and narcissism, drawing on scientific research, but focus on narcissistic personality traits “among the normal population” and cultural narcissism that goes deep into social values. The authors debunk myths about narcissism—that it is necessary in order to be competitive and that narcissists are actually overcompensating for low self-esteem. Although young girls have been hit hardest by the narcissism epidemic, with unrealistic notions of physical beauty, the scourge has affected us all—witness Wall Street greed and the mortgage crisis with its overblown sense of materialism and entitlement. The authors argue that the nation needs to recognize the epidemic and its negative consequences, and take corrective action. Individuals can start by practicing gratitude, and parents can teach their children friendship skills, with the emphasis on others rather than self. --Vanessa Bush --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Review

"The other night, when I was reading Twenge and Campbell's excellent and timely new book, my husband was busy framing a fake Sports Illustrated cover, with a picture of our 7-year old over the caption, "Player of the Year." The Narcissism Epidemic will hew close to the bone, rouse, and provoke many readers as it shines a spotlight on an important -- and highly costly -- trend in our lives. Rooted in hard data and illuminated with revealing anecdotes, stories, and solutions, The Narcissism Epidemic is both a pleasure and an education. But enough about this book. Let's talk about me." -- Sonja Lyubomirsky, Ph.D., author of The How of Happiness: A Scientific Approach to Getting the Life You Want

"An important and illuminating book. Drs. Twenge and Campbell expertly analyze many strands of American culture and reveal an alarming tapestry of psychocultural narcissism. They also offer sound strategies for slowing this epidemic." -- Jean Kilbourne, Ed.D., author of Can't Buy My Love: How Advertising Changes the Way We Think and Feel and So Sexy So Soon: The New Sexualized Childhood and What Parents Can Do to Protect Their Kids

"Filled with important, disturbing research detailing the alarming cultural spread of narcissism today -- a serious social problem to which many people are unwittingly contributing without realizing the disastrous consequences. The authors give sound advice and provide an important resource for anyone who cares about compassion, empathy, and emotional connection rather than ME, ME, ME!" -- Karyl McBride, Ph.D., author of Will I Ever Be Good Enough? Healing the Daughters of Narcissistic Mothers

"The Narcissism Epidemic is a must read, an essential antidote to a culture spinning out of control. Filled with facts, fascinating examples, and written in a highly readable style, Twenge and Campbell's outstanding book shows how narcissism has been on the rise and has taken over almost every part of our lives and how we can rescue our culture from ourselves. An outstanding accomplishment by two people who truly care about the debacle of self-worship. It should be read by anyone interested in the future of our country" -- Robert L. Leahy, Ph.D., author of Anxiety Free: Unravel Your Fears Before They Unravel You

"Phenomenal...The Narcissism Epidemic clearly and succinctly identifies the dangerous disease and the catastrophic ways it threatens our society and future, and reveals urgently needed solutions at every level. The chapter on parenting alone makes this book priceless and should be compulsory reading." -- Patrick Wanis PhD, Celebrity Life Coach, Human Behavior & Relationship Expert, author of How to Find Happiness

"A must-read for anyone who is a parent, a relationship partner, in the workforce, in school, or on the job market. Twenge and Campbell not only define narcissism but detail its antecedents, consequences, and underlying processes in a way that brings together so much of what one sees in modern western culture. Grounded in research and peppered with media and anecdotal stories, The Narcissism Epidemic offers practical, much-needed solutions to coping in the age of entitlement." -- Kathleen Vohs, Ph.D., University of Minnesota McKnight Land-Grant Professor, Editor of Self and Relationships: Connecting Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Processes

"This insightful book shows us how the epidemic of narcissism touches almost all aspects of our lives. Twenge and Campbell's astute analysis and salient anecdotes powerfully map the problem and the high price we all pay. They expertly show us the kinds of actions we can take to free ourselves of the epidemic's ruthless grip and how the future wellbeing of humane society depends on our doing so." -- Diane E. Levin, Ph.D., Professor of Education at Wheelock College and co-author of So Sexy So Soon: The New Sexualized Childhood and What Parents Can Do to Protect Their Kids

"The evidence Twenge and Campbell have compiled is compelling and appalling.... Twenge and Campbell marshal statistics, polls, charts, studies and anecdotes to assemble a complete picture of the epidemic's current state of contagion, brought on by the Internet, reality television, a booming economy, easy credit and other developments over the past decade. The authors dismantle the prevailing myths that have made us inclined to tolerate and even encourage narcissism: that it's a function of high self-esteem, that it's a function of low self-esteem, that a little narcissism is healthy, that narcissists are in fact superior, that you have to love yourself to be able to love someone else." -- New York Times Style Magazine

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Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joe Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign [Hardcover] David Powell (Author)

Book Description

November 19, 2010
Confederate cavalry has a storied and favorable relationship with the history of the Civil War. Tales of raids and daring exploits create a whiff of lingering romance about the horse soldiers of the Lost Cause. Sometimes, however, romance obscures history.

In August 1863 William Rosecrans' Union Army of the Cumberland embarked on a campaign of maneuver to turn Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga, one of the most important industrial and logistical centers of the Confederacy. Despite the presence of two Southern cavalry corps (nearly 14,000 horsemen) under legendary commanders Nathan Bedford Forrest and Joe Wheeler, Union troops crossed the Tennessee River unopposed and unseen, slipped through the passes cutting across the knife-ridged mountains, moved into the narrow valleys, and turned Bragg's left flank. Threatened with the loss of the railroad that fed his







army, Bragg had no choice but to retreat. He lost Chattanooga without a fight.

After two more weeks of maneuvering, skirmishing, and botched attacks Bragg struck back at Chickamauga, where he was once again surprised by the position of the Union army and the manner in which the fighting unfolded. Although the combat ended with a stunning Southern





victory, Federal counterblows that November reversed all that had been so dearly purchased.

David A. Powell's Failure in the Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joseph Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign is the first in-depth attempt to determine what role the Confederate cavalry played in both the loss of Chattanooga and the staggering number of miscues that followed up to, through, and beyond Chickamauga. Powell draws upon an array of primary accounts and his intimate knowledge of the battlefield to reach several startling conclusions: Bragg's experienced cavalry generals routinely fed him misleading information, failed to screen important passes and river crossings, allowed petty command politics to routinely influence their decision-making, and on more than one occasion disobeyed specific and repeated orders that may have changed the course of the campaign.

Richly detailed and elegantly written, Failure in the Saddle offers new perspectives on the role of the Rebel horsemen in every combat large and small waged during this long and bloody campaign and, by default, a fresh assessment of the generalship of Braxton Bragg. This judiciously reasoned account includes a guided tour of the cavalry operations, several appendices of important information, and original cartography. It is essential reading for students of the Western Theater.

About the Author: David A. Powell is a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute (Class of 1983) with a BA in history. He has published numerous articles in magazines, more than fifteen historical simulations of various battles, and is the co-author (with David A. Friedrichs) of The Maps of Chickamauga: An Atlas of the Chickamauga Campaign, Including the Tullahoma Operations, June 22-September 23, 1863, a selection of the History and Military book clubs.



Praise:



David A. Powell s deeply researched and thoroughly analyzed Failure in the Saddle demonstrates that the vaunted Confederate cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forrest and Joe Wheeler failed miserably during the Chickamauga Campaign. Their errors mislead Gen. Braxton Bragg, lost Chattanooga to the Confederacy, and turned the great success at Chickamauga into an empty victory. Eric J. Wittenberg, award-winning Civil War cavalry historian

Nelson's Trafalgar: The Battle That Changed the World [Paperback] Roy Adkins (Author)

Book Description

0143037951 978-0143037958 October 31, 2006
An explosive chronicle of history's greatest sea battle

In the tradition of Antony Beevor's Stalingrad, Nelson's Trafalgar presents the definitive blow-by-blow account of the world's most famous naval battle, when the British Royal Navy under Lord Horatio Nelson dealt a decisive blow to the forces of Napoleon. The Battle of Trafalgar comes boldly to life in this definitive work that re-creates those five momentous, earsplitting hours with unrivaled detail and intensity.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Starred Review. This illustrious introduction to the Battle of Trafalgar from an archeologist and historian is one of the best in generations for the nonseafaring reader curious about the nautical epic, and it also handsomely rewards those whose study of the battle goes back a generation or two. The battle itself and its aftermath form most of the narrative, interspersed with details of gunnery, ship handling, discipline, construction, damage control and shipboard health and medicine (not for the weak of stomach). The author gives full credit to the heroism of both sides—the dismasted Spanish flagship Santa Ana; the crew of the British Belleisle, also reduced to a wreck; and the aptly named French Redoubtable, from whose tops a stray bullet killed Nelson. Also given in more than usual detail is the weeks-long aftermath of storms, which sank most of the British prizes and during which the British further distinguished themselves by rescuing and landing enemy survivors. "If blood be the price of Admiralty, Lord God we ha' paid in full," Kipling wrote decades later, and this narrative of one of the bloodier occasions in winning that Admiralty is fully worthy of its subject. (On sale Aug. 22)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Booklist

Adkins' account focuses on the day of the Battle of Trafalgar, October 21, 1805, commenting upon the technology and tactics of sailing-ship navies and the readiness of the particular fleets that met at Trafalgar. An explanation of the strategic situation of France's threatened invasion of Britain frames the center stage of the narrative, a broadside-by-broadside description of which ship was where during the battle. Amid this structure, Adkins incorporates excerpts from survivors' accounts, which retain their gory power to appall. Trafalgar was a slaughter, a consequence of the near impossibility of sinking a wooden ship-of-the-line; hence, the British commander's decision to gain victory by closing with and killing enemy gunners. Writing in the traditional way about Nelson, Adkins knowledgeably narrates events for readers just discovering the blood-and-guts chronology of Trafalgar. Gilbert Taylor
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved --This t




45 of 48 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars I prefer the British Title, "the Biography of a Battle" - much more illustratative I think, November 21, 2005
The british subtitled this book, "The biography of a battle" - which seems to much more accurately describes exactly what this book is - it treats the whole battle as a biography, allowing all the information to speak to build up a comprehensive picture of just what this battle meant - both in the lead up, and in the aftermath.

I would highly recommend this book to others who have not read much about sea battles of this period before. Adkins is enormously readable, his prose flows and is neatly interspersed with quotes of contemporarys both describing the battle, and everyday life where appropriate

The first part of the book is very much about the basics. There is a short introduction to Nelson's colourful life and career, a lot about the life and times of a seaman, and much useful information about life onboard ship in this period. Just what it was like to serve in the Nvy of George III. It was easy to understand the hardships and deprivation when reading this - the shortage of good food - which was generally maggoty or mouldy, or both. The smells from the lack of good sanitation, the terrible water which was unfiltered and stored in uncleaned barrels so that it soon became noxious and full of algae.

It was a hard life for anyone, and even Nelson did not touch land once for at least 2 years. The difference in life for officers and enlisted men was significant though. Conditions, food, clothing, position on board all played a significant role.

So the first part of this book sets the stage for the battle - it also dwells in excellent detail on the political situation, the pending Napoleonic invasion of Britain, the reaction, the blockades by British ships of French and Spanish ports, the lead up battles, such as that of the Nile, and so on.

The battle itself lasted but sixhours, and is discussed almost cannon blow by cannon blow. It is a confusing battle but Adkins is very clear with his detail and makes it enormously interesting. The aftermath of the battle, the messengers attempts to get to London, and the 'fruits' of trafalgar make up the last chapters.

It is a thoughtful book, written, I believe, with an eye on the novice reader. I did not find it talked-down to the reader though. Rather it used the social and military information as complimentary to the build up of the battle, as a reminder to the context it was fought in.

There are extremely useful illustrations and some maps in this to help the reader, they are easily referenced too

Overall I loved this book and will be recommending it to others. Given that we have just passed the 200th anniversary of it, it was published at a significant time and makes excellent reading.
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26 of 27 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars The battle that changed the world, November 13, 2005
This is in the balance an excellent work of naval history and truly readable. It is a well-paced account of the pivotal naval battle of the Napoleonic Wars, where a British fleet commanded by Lord Horatio Nelson engaged the combined fleet of the Spanish and French near Cadiz. The British decisively defeated the Combined Fleet, effectively ending Napoleon's naval ambitions and any question of a cross-channel invasion of England. Trafalgar was the last great naval battle between fleets of sailing ships, and led the way to the British domination of the seas during the 19th century.

The book is a page-turning, captivating account of the actual mechanics of a sea battle with sailing ships. Adkins has considerable skill in making dramatic even the preparations before the battle - for instance noting the chilling but necessary sand strewn on decks for aiding footing in slippery blood. The combat itself he describes with a cinematic vitality, his details of the five hours of combat endured by sailors on both sides evokes a truly hellish stew of violent chaos, splinters, and smoke. A glimpse of this reality was recently portrayed in the movie Master and Commander, where two contemporary ships blast away at point blank range with shattering violence.

The book makes considerable use of first person accounts, but these are predominantly British, as is the perspective of the book. In describing the aspects of the sailing ships the English perspective is given, usually with an added comment that French and Spanish conditions were similar. The decisive difference was in the clearly superior skill and training of the British sailors and gunners. And that made the difference in the battle.

Which leads me to what I think is the books one flaw - the emphasis on Nelson himself seems considerably misplaced. The title "Nelson's Trafalgar" is simply not born out by the argument of the book. There was very little strategic thinking or command tactical control of the battle - the shape of the battle took place on Nelson's plan roughly as the shape of the letter "pi", with the English fleet making up the two legs colliding at a right angle to the French and dividing the latter into thirds. This was anticipated by the French admirals, and it is also unclear that this strategy gave the British any tactical advantage since the long range gunnery of the French and Spanish was so poor. Nelson's idea was to engage the combined fleet in a "pell mell" battle - in other words to create a situation where there was no tactical fleet control of the battle. Furthermore Nelson was mortally wounded at the outbreak of the battle. In these conditions the outcome of the battle was decided by the skill of the average British gunner. Adkin's comments in this regard are nuanced but he clearly is uncritical of the glowing mythology built around Nelson's "brilliance." He is better to listen to the commander of the French fleet's comment, which he quotes: "to any other Nation the loss of a Nelson would have been irreparable, but in the British Fleet of Cadiz, every captain was a Nelson."




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22 of 25 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars A Great Read!, August 18, 2005
I'm a big fan of Roy Adkins, having read his books on archaeology--which I treasure on my bookshelves. Adkins magnificently details this historic naval battle between the French and Spanish on the one side and the British on the other. Adkins not only gives a memorable overview of the battle, but he also takes the time to explain various aspects of life at the time on board ship, as well as the reasons leading to the battle. What is also a great surprise is that there was a huge storm afterwards, in which more far people lost their lives than in the battle itself. The author then goes on to recount how the news was brought to England after the battle and how it spread to the rest of the world. This is a very stirring and often sad story, much recommended.
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Monday, January 2, 2012

Leningrad State of Siege M. Jones










Leningrad: State of Siege



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Leningrad: State of Siege [Bargain Price] [Hardcover]

Michael Jones (Author)





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Book Description

August 4, 2008
“All offers of surrender from Leningrad must be rejected,” wrote Adolph Hitler on September 29, 1941, at the outset of Operation Barbarossa. “In this struggle for survival, we have no interest in keeping even a proportion of the city’s population alive.”

During the famed 900-day siege of Leningrad, the German High Command deliberately planned to eradicate the city’s population through starvation. Viewing the Slavs as sub-human, Hitler embarked on a vicious program of ethnic cleansing. By the time the siege ended in January 1944, almost a million people had died. Those who survived would be marked permanently by what they endured as the city descended into chaos.

In Leningrad, military historian Michael Jones chronicles the human story of this epic siege. Drawing on newly available eyewitness accounts and diaries, he reveals the true horrors of the ordeal—including stories long-suppressed by the Soviets of looting, criminal gangs, and cannibalism. But he also shows the immense psychological resources on which the citizens of Leningrad drew to survive against desperate odds. At the height of the siege, for instance, an extraordinary live performance of Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony profoundly strengthened the city’s will to resist.

A riveting account of one of the most harrowing sieges of world history, Leningrad also portrays the astonishing power of the human will in the face of even the direst catastrophe.


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"The Herald" (Glasgow), May 17, 2007
"Jones charts the journey through moral and physical nightmare via the recollections of some who clung doggedly to life and from the diaries of many who did not see the end of the torment. It is a powerful narrative, evoking images of a descent into chaos few who had not experienced it could possibly imagine....Jones's gripping account is a tribute to the resilience of the human spirit in circumstances where it might easily have been overwhelmed, not by German firepower, but by sheer horror." --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

About the Author

Michael Jones has a Ph.D. in history from Bristol University and has taught at Glasgow University and Winchester College. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, he has previously written books on Agincourt and Stalingrad. He lives in Croyden, England.

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32 of 34 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars A highly recommended account of the Leningrad blockade, July 24, 2008
This book was not an easy read, but one that needed to be written, especially considering all the new literature out there, in both English and Russian, about the siege. This work brings together accounts from dozens of sources and interviews to tell an altogether harrowing tale of how millions trapped within Leningrad had to struggle to survive. One of the main points this book will try to address, as Jones did in his previous book on Stalingrad, is how the citizens and soldiers of this city managed to survive and eventually defeat their German opponents. The psychological angle is one that is not often presented as being important. Usually, weapons, commanders, and numbers are glorified or blamed by one side or the other. Here, we have that idea of 'morale' being given center stage, as well as seeing what it is capable of achieving.

Very interesting descriptions are given in regards to when Zhukov took over control of the North Western Front from Voroshilov. On September 11th, 1941, Zhukov assumed command and soon after the 4th Panzer Group was taken out of the area and switched over in preparation for Operation Typhoon, which would throw it against the defenders of Moscow. Zhukov, apparently, couldn't be convinced by those around him that the Germans were digging in around Leningrad and further offensive actions were being discontinued. The end result was a series of needless offensives by Red Army troops in the Oranienbaum bridgehead and around Leningrad which needlessly wasted lives. When a commander refused to obey, in one instance, he was 'sacked' and his replacement was given the same orders. At another part of the front a marine landing unit of 200 men was sent against their target in broad daylight, they were picked off in the water by the Germans and only 14 managed to reach the shoreline (pg. 117). The actions on the Nevsky bridgehead are quite telling of the time and desperation the Red Army found itself in. Units of the 54th Army, under Kulik, were a mere 9 miles away from the Nevsky bridgehead, which if broken through to would have created a corridor to besieged Leningrad. As Kulik's forces could not break through, it appears that Zhukov tried his hardest from the other side. He threw unit after unit into action, trying to break through to the 'main land'. Divisions were ground down to mere hundreds of men and, at least one marine brigade, simply ceased to exist. This seems to ring quite true with what I am familiar with in regards to Zhukov. He seems to be more than willing to sacrifice ten thousand or twenty thousand men if it means saving millions. On the 21st of November, Zhdanov, after taking over when Zhukov left to help defend Moscow, ordered Colonel Ivan Frolov and his 80th Rifle Division into battle with exhausted soldiers who were short on ammunition. Frolov refused to issue the orders and was replaced by another commander who would send his men into a frontal assault over an open expanse of a frozen lake, "the men were mown down in their thousands" (pg. 140). In the end Zhdanov needed a scapegoat and Frolov, along with the divisional commissar, who was also dismissed, were brought in front of a military tribunal. Both were found guilty of "cowardice and criminal negligence that resulted in the failure of the operation" and were shot on December 3rd.

The chapters the author devotes to the people living and suffering in Leningrad will gnaw at your heart. The elderly, women and children slowly lost their sanity as hunger began to take its toll on them. In the midst of all that suffering, they still endured constant German artillery bombardments. Yet, there was still hope. In one instance, during a bombing of the city, violinists are trapped in a shelter with civilians. In the middle of explosions one begins to play his violin and, miraculously, no longer are the deafening noises the only thing those trapped in the shelter can think about, the terror that had gripped them all was somehow transported outside their bodies, and the powerful music, was all they could concentrate on. Another account portrays a woman pulling her double bass through the snow on a sled, trying to make it to a hospital for a concert recital. Behind the sled, pushing, was her young child.

Disturbing are the scenes of cannibalism and dead bodies in the streets missing limbs or simply the meat from their bones. While the civilian administration and those with high status seemed to be well fed, the rest of Leningrad, suffered and died by the thousands during that first winter of 1941/1942. While cannibalism might have been heard about via rumors during the siege, I believe this book shows more than enough evidence that it was at times an all too common phenomenon. The suppression by the government and local administrators of what the siege did to the people and the city was enlightening, I had never really encountered such information before. One would think the government would use this cruelty, on the part of the Germans, to their advantage and their people's suffering to its greatest effect on the population, but apparently talk of it was forbidden. I can only guess that such full disclosure would cause the citizens of the Soviet Union to question their government in ways which were not wanted. One story which I ran across, and have read before (in Bellamy's "Absolute War") was in regards to "The Rebel" which was leaving leaflets, trying to incite the population against the Soviet leadership, and sending letters to Zhdanov, etc. The resources poured into investigating this one man were enormous, tens of thousands of people were interviewed and their hand writing was compared to try to find the culprit. The author feels this was a waste of resources considering what the city was going through, I'd have to agree on one hand. On the other, it seems the perpetrator had to be found and, as the NKVD had been known to do, any person could have been hauled off the street and put in prison or killed for the offense (a confession could have been beaten out of them, etc) but instead the authorities tried their best to actually find the guilty party.

The majority of the stories told here, be they from the military or civilian population, will make you think twice about what it might take to survive an event like this. Words can't begin to describe what these people endured and overcome. What kind of will power and stamina it takes to stand in line for hours trying to get food, to lead a normal life and go to work everyday as people slowly die in front of your eyes. How much can one endure as death becomes a constant companion on each trip to visit a loved one, a friend, or a co-worker and check up on how they are doing? Many times civilians would walk along the street only to see someone in front of them slowly fall to the ground and lay there without the strength to even ask for help. I found myself having to reread passages dozens of times, the meaning of these words and what they represented just couldn't sink in. How humanity is capable of such cruelty and indifference and yet such love and devotion baffles the mind.
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31 of 35 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars Just not enough of the details, September 11, 2008
The first two reviews written on this book were written by people that really know this area of history. I cannot compare myself to them and so I'm going to try to pick a different set of topics from which to write this review. I love to read history, but I'm a rookie compared to my colleagues, so my focus will be on the writing itself and readability.

This book is very readable, however, that said, I found myself drifting through the first 100 pages without that drive I receive from some authors. The second chapter was designated by the author to ream out Voroshilov. He started on him at the beginning of the chapter and didn't let up for 40 pages. I found the constant belittling to be a little over the top. I'm not saying that Voroshilov didn't deserve some pummeling, but enough is enough. Additionally, I believe in the saying that "A fish rots from the head", and there is no doubt who was really calling the shots. So even if Voroshilov is to blame for the execution of the defense, Stalin is still the ultimate responsible individual. Although I'm critical of the continuous hammering on Voroshilov, the author makes some very good points and shows that the "purge" in the Red Army by Stalin and his henchmen had a very dramatic effect on the Siege of Leningrad leaving someone like Voroshilov in charge.

I also judge a non-fiction history on the way the author sets up the bibliography; this one is just plain sloppy and the author lazy. I might get some static on this point, because much on the new story here is supposed to be from diaries and interviews, but the reader will never know which is from what.

It is difficult to see where the author's opinion and his interviews or the diaries leave off. An example of Jones' use of his own opinion (or at least undocumented) is on page 114: "Zhukov was unable to contain his exasperation with his predecessor (Voroshilov)". And yet, Jones makes no mention of how he knows of this exasperation or if there was anything in particular that was said to anyone about it. I can assume that Zhukov might have felt that he was placed into a disastrous situation, but this is the constant type of nitpicking at Voroshilov that Jones cannot stop - and it gets old to the reader. Much of it may be true, but due the poor footnoting, the reader will never know.

Maps: Why in a history book with a focus on particular points of interests and battles, is there not a map or illustration for every major event? For pages and pages, the Nevsky Bridgehead is described, but not one illustration or picture or depiction of what it looked like or how the troops of both sides were situated is displayed. I really dislike when illustrations are not used. I will concede that that there are two maps that describe many of the relationships of the cities and towns, however, not all of the cities and towns discussed in the book are on the maps - dumb.

Additionally, I was very disappointed in the failure to give the German side of the story with any detail. What were the soldiers thinking at the Bridgehead? We do get some information about the German decisions as they moved into position, but not enough first person accounts. After all, this is about the Leningrad Siege - it should be researched from both accounts, not just the Russian side.

Michael Jones considers himself a specialist in military history, but I found the first 125 pages to be the slowest of the book as he was unwinding the opening surge and set up of German forces. At about page 125, he begins to get into the Russia people and their diaries. This is the fascinating part of the book for me. The stories of the people are heartbreaking and soul searching and then heartwarming. But even in this section, he skips around chronologically when that should not be necessary. It breaks the flow of the story and it is not necessary in this type of book. Again, there were moments of truly terrific writing by Jones - i.e. the setup and telling of the 7th Symphony.

But after these couple of chapters, Jones again gets into more military work with the breakup of the defenses of the Germans. This is necessary, but the way in which it was told broke up the flow of the story. In the middle of the bombardment of the Germans, Jones takes two paragraphs to tell a story about a little boy named Davidov, who was picked on by some bullies - why? With all of the stories to be told, this was a strange inclusion.

I'm glad that I took the time to read about the Siege, but I'm afraid that this is just not the perfect book on this historic event. It just doesn't have enough information and detail of what was going on in both the German and Soviet headquarters. We went from everyone dying of starvation to the Red Army breaking out with more artillery and shells and people than they ever had in a battle. We saw nothing about the build up. There was just too much detail unaccounted. The thought process is missing. Jones was somewhat successful in his approach to find the underlying hope of the people but he extended the reach of the book to include military information and I felt that he failed at this. This rendition of Leningrad's Siege just left me unsatisfied.
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2.0 out of 5 stars A Shallow and Derivative Effort, August 4, 2008
The siege of Leningrad was first dealt with comprehensively by Harrison Salisbury's The 900 Days in 1969 and further detailed by David Glantz's The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944 in 2002. British historian Michael Jones builds upon these earlier works, as well as interviews he conducted with survivors of the siege in order to write Leningrad: State of Siege. Jones' book is narrowly focused on the worst period of the siege during November 1941 to March 1942. The authors' main focus is on the human horror and tragedy occurring within the city, where tens of thousands were starving to death each month, although he does reserve some space to discuss the futile defense of the Nevskaya Dubrovka bridgehead. Jones style is to depict the `psychological aspect' of battle - what motivated the city's population to hold out under severe duress. Unfortunately, this book is written in a very shallow style that doesn't go much beyond unconnected interviews with survivors and the better parts of the book are derived almost in toto from Salisbury and Glantz. Too much of the book is written in a shrill, sensationalist tone and this author does not appear to know the difference between rumors, speculation and historical fact. The author's main tranche of `new' research rests on assertions that their was more cannibalism within the city than previously admitted and that the government nearly lost control of parts of the city in late January 1942 - which is hardly surprising to anyone who has read a few books on this subject.

The authors' main hypothesis is that the military and political leadership in Leningrad let the population down and that they could have done more to alleviate suffering and hunger. The two main culprits identified by the author are Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and Andrei Zhdanov (Leningrad Communist party boss). In chapter two, the author begins an all-out assault on Voroshilov (using a crude epithet from Khrushchev) and claims that, "it was Voroshilov's woeful influence in the first vital months of the war that set in place the city's military disaster." Jones' method is broad-brush, personal attacks. Voroshilov's incompetence is accepted ipso facto, not examined. He begins the attack by claiming that, "Voroshilov was focus[ed] on constructing one line of defense, along the Luga River, seventy miles from Leningrad," but fails to note that this was ordered by General Popov - never mentioned by name in the book - and that construction was also begun on fortified areas closer to Leningrad. Reading David Glantz, there is little doubt that the dogged defense of the Luga Line and these other fortified areas bought vital time for Leningrad. Jones claims that Voroshilov's commitment of untrained militia divisions was a `senseless sacrifice' but these units were not wiped out as he claimed and they played a vital role in saving Leningrad. The author proceeds to lay every single defect of the Red Army at Voroshilov's feet, as if he were solely responsible for the German ability to reach Leningrad. This is not to say that Voroshilov was a great general or minister of defense - he wasn't - but attacks of this sort are too simplistic to explain a complex event.

The author then moves on to attack Zhdanov, who is accused of `doing nothing,' of organizing `black market food deals,' or `gorging himself while the city starved,' etc. This interpretation is 180 degrees off from that provided by Salisbury, who did his homework a lot better than this author. It is a matter of historical fact that Zhdanov organized the militia and the Road of Life, both of which made major contributions to saving the city. Many of the attacks on Zhdanov are of the `he was a pig' sort, asserted by people who were 20 or just children during the siege; it is doubtful that these people ever met him. The author never mentions the Leningrad Military Council (LMC) and he is under the mistaken impression that Zhdanov was directing military operations. Amazingly, Soviet military leaders who played critical roles in the siege - Khozin, Fediuninskiy and Meretskov - are mentioned only once in the entire book. The author makes ridiculous claims that all of Leningrad's food was destroyed in the Badaev warehouse fire (more like 5 percent) and blames Zhdanov for stupidly storing it all in one place - which simply wasn't true. He also blames Voroshilov and Zhdanov for `panicking' and deciding to scuttle the Baltic Fleet (this was a direct order from Stalin) and claims Zhukov was the one who began using the fleet for naval gunfire support, but this actually began under Voroshilov. Indeed, many of the author's accusations are unfounded and based more on rumor and innuendo.

The author does acknowledge Soviet success in creating the `Road of Life' across frozen Lake Ladoga - giving no credit to Zhdanov - but provides much less data than appeared in Salisbury or Glantz. He completely ignores the problem of the Osinevets-Leningrad railroad which brought food into Leningrad and suggests that a great deal of food was withheld from ordinary people and reserved for the Communist party elite. Although there was certainly corruption in the pipeline, the author fails to realize that the city needed over 1,000 tons of food per day but the road was not capable of delivering this much food until late February 1942, by which point thousands had starved. On page 195, the author boldly states that, "much, much more could have been done by Leningrad's authorities." Like what? An immense amount was achieved at great cost in life to keep Leningrad going and glib assertions that try to wish away the whole siege are just nonsense.
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