Book Description
“All offers of surrender from Leningrad must be rejected,” wrote Adolph Hitler on September 29, 1941, at the outset of Operation Barbarossa. “In this struggle for survival, we have no interest in keeping even a proportion of the city’s population alive.”
During the famed 900-day siege of Leningrad, the German High Command deliberately planned to eradicate the city’s population through starvation. Viewing the Slavs as sub-human, Hitler embarked on a vicious program of ethnic cleansing. By the time the siege ended in January 1944, almost a million people had died. Those who survived would be marked permanently by what they endured as the city descended into chaos.
In Leningrad, military historian Michael Jones chronicles the human story of this epic siege. Drawing on newly available eyewitness accounts and diaries, he reveals the true horrors of the ordeal—including stories long-suppressed by the Soviets of looting, criminal gangs, and cannibalism. But he also shows the immense psychological resources on which the citizens of Leningrad drew to survive against desperate odds. At the height of the siege, for instance, an extraordinary live performance of Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony profoundly strengthened the city’s will to resist.
A riveting account of one of the most harrowing sieges of world history, Leningrad also portrays the astonishing power of the human will in the face of even the direst catastrophe.
Editorial Reviews
Review
"The Herald" (Glasgow), May 17, 2007
"Jones charts the journey through moral and physical nightmare via the recollections of some who clung doggedly to life and from the diaries of many who did not see the end of the torment. It is a powerful narrative, evoking images of a descent into chaos few who had not experienced it could possibly imagine....Jones's gripping account is a tribute to the resilience of the human spirit in circumstances where it might easily have been overwhelmed, not by German firepower, but by sheer horror." --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
"Jones charts the journey through moral and physical nightmare via the recollections of some who clung doggedly to life and from the diaries of many who did not see the end of the torment. It is a powerful narrative, evoking images of a descent into chaos few who had not experienced it could possibly imagine....Jones's gripping account is a tribute to the resilience of the human spirit in circumstances where it might easily have been overwhelmed, not by German firepower, but by sheer horror." --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
About the Author
Michael Jones has a Ph.D. in history from Bristol University and has taught at Glasgow University and Winchester College. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, he has previously written books on Agincourt and Stalingrad. He lives in Croyden, England.
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| Most Helpful Customer Reviews 32 of 34 people found the following review helpful: 5.0 out of 5 stars A highly recommended account of the Leningrad blockade, By This review is from: Leningrad: State of Siege (Hardcover) This book was not an easy read, but one that needed to be written, especially considering all the new literature out there, in both English and Russian, about the siege. This work brings together accounts from dozens of sources and interviews to tell an altogether harrowing tale of how millions trapped within Leningrad had to struggle to survive. One of the main points this book will try to address, as Jones did in his previous book on Stalingrad, is how the citizens and soldiers of this city managed to survive and eventually defeat their German opponents. The psychological angle is one that is not often presented as being important. Usually, weapons, commanders, and numbers are glorified or blamed by one side or the other. Here, we have that idea of 'morale' being given center stage, as well as seeing what it is capable of achieving.Very interesting descriptions are given in regards to when Zhukov took over control of the North Western Front from Voroshilov. On September 11th, 1941, Zhukov assumed command and soon after the 4th Panzer Group was taken out of the area and switched over in preparation for Operation Typhoon, which would throw it against the defenders of Moscow. Zhukov, apparently, couldn't be convinced by those around him that the Germans were digging in around Leningrad and further offensive actions were being discontinued. The end result was a series of needless offensives by Red Army troops in the Oranienbaum bridgehead and around Leningrad which needlessly wasted lives. When a commander refused to obey, in one instance, he was 'sacked' and his replacement was given the same orders. At another part of the front a marine landing unit of 200 men was sent against their target in broad daylight, they were picked off in the water by the Germans and only 14 managed to reach the shoreline (pg. 117). The actions on the Nevsky bridgehead are quite telling of the time and desperation the Red Army found itself in. Units of the 54th Army, under Kulik, were a mere 9 miles away from the Nevsky bridgehead, which if broken through to would have created a corridor to besieged Leningrad. As Kulik's forces could not break through, it appears that Zhukov tried his hardest from the other side. He threw unit after unit into action, trying to break through to the 'main land'. Divisions were ground down to mere hundreds of men and, at least one marine brigade, simply ceased to exist. This seems to ring quite true with what I am familiar with in regards to Zhukov. He seems to be more than willing to sacrifice ten thousand or twenty thousand men if it means saving millions. On the 21st of November, Zhdanov, after taking over when Zhukov left to help defend Moscow, ordered Colonel Ivan Frolov and his 80th Rifle Division into battle with exhausted soldiers who were short on ammunition. Frolov refused to issue the orders and was replaced by another commander who would send his men into a frontal assault over an open expanse of a frozen lake, "the men were mown down in their thousands" (pg. 140). In the end Zhdanov needed a scapegoat and Frolov, along with the divisional commissar, who was also dismissed, were brought in front of a military tribunal. Both were found guilty of "cowardice and criminal negligence that resulted in the failure of the operation" and were shot on December 3rd. The chapters the author devotes to the people living and suffering in Leningrad will gnaw at your heart. The elderly, women and children slowly lost their sanity as hunger began to take its toll on them. In the midst of all that suffering, they still endured constant German artillery bombardments. Yet, there was still hope. In one instance, during a bombing of the city, violinists are trapped in a shelter with civilians. In the middle of explosions one begins to play his violin and, miraculously, no longer are the deafening noises the only thing those trapped in the shelter can think about, the terror that had gripped them all was somehow transported outside their bodies, and the powerful music, was all they could concentrate on. Another account portrays a woman pulling her double bass through the snow on a sled, trying to make it to a hospital for a concert recital. Behind the sled, pushing, was her young child. Disturbing are the scenes of cannibalism and dead bodies in the streets missing limbs or simply the meat from their bones. While the civilian administration and those with high status seemed to be well fed, the rest of Leningrad, suffered and died by the thousands during that first winter of 1941/1942. While cannibalism might have been heard about via rumors during the siege, I believe this book shows more than enough evidence that it was at times an all too common phenomenon. The suppression by the government and local administrators of what the siege did to the people and the city was enlightening, I had never really encountered such information before. One would think the government would use this cruelty, on the part of the Germans, to their advantage and their people's suffering to its greatest effect on the population, but apparently talk of it was forbidden. I can only guess that such full disclosure would cause the citizens of the Soviet Union to question their government in ways which were not wanted. One story which I ran across, and have read before (in Bellamy's "Absolute War") was in regards to "The Rebel" which was leaving leaflets, trying to incite the population against the Soviet leadership, and sending letters to Zhdanov, etc. The resources poured into investigating this one man were enormous, tens of thousands of people were interviewed and their hand writing was compared to try to find the culprit. The author feels this was a waste of resources considering what the city was going through, I'd have to agree on one hand. On the other, it seems the perpetrator had to be found and, as the NKVD had been known to do, any person could have been hauled off the street and put in prison or killed for the offense (a confession could have been beaten out of them, etc) but instead the authorities tried their best to actually find the guilty party. The majority of the stories told here, be they from the military or civilian population, will make you think twice about what it might take to survive an event like this. Words can't begin to describe what these people endured and overcome. What kind of will power and stamina it takes to stand in line for hours trying to get food, to lead a normal life and go to work everyday as people slowly die in front of your eyes. How much can one endure as death becomes a constant companion on each trip to visit a loved one, a friend, or a co-worker and check up on how they are doing? Many times civilians would walk along the street only to see someone in front of them slowly fall to the ground and lay there without the strength to even ask for help. I found myself having to reread passages dozens of times, the meaning of these words and what they represented just couldn't sink in. How humanity is capable of such cruelty and indifference and yet such love and devotion baffles the mind. 31 of 35 people found the following review helpful: 3.0 out of 5 stars Just not enough of the details, By This review is from: Leningrad: State of Siege (Hardcover) The first two reviews written on this book were written by people that really know this area of history. I cannot compare myself to them and so I'm going to try to pick a different set of topics from which to write this review. I love to read history, but I'm a rookie compared to my colleagues, so my focus will be on the writing itself and readability.This book is very readable, however, that said, I found myself drifting through the first 100 pages without that drive I receive from some authors. The second chapter was designated by the author to ream out Voroshilov. He started on him at the beginning of the chapter and didn't let up for 40 pages. I found the constant belittling to be a little over the top. I'm not saying that Voroshilov didn't deserve some pummeling, but enough is enough. Additionally, I believe in the saying that "A fish rots from the head", and there is no doubt who was really calling the shots. So even if Voroshilov is to blame for the execution of the defense, Stalin is still the ultimate responsible individual. Although I'm critical of the continuous hammering on Voroshilov, the author makes some very good points and shows that the "purge" in the Red Army by Stalin and his henchmen had a very dramatic effect on the Siege of Leningrad leaving someone like Voroshilov in charge. I also judge a non-fiction history on the way the author sets up the bibliography; this one is just plain sloppy and the author lazy. I might get some static on this point, because much on the new story here is supposed to be from diaries and interviews, but the reader will never know which is from what. It is difficult to see where the author's opinion and his interviews or the diaries leave off. An example of Jones' use of his own opinion (or at least undocumented) is on page 114: "Zhukov was unable to contain his exasperation with his predecessor (Voroshilov)". And yet, Jones makes no mention of how he knows of this exasperation or if there was anything in particular that was said to anyone about it. I can assume that Zhukov might have felt that he was placed into a disastrous situation, but this is the constant type of nitpicking at Voroshilov that Jones cannot stop - and it gets old to the reader. Much of it may be true, but due the poor footnoting, the reader will never know. Maps: Why in a history book with a focus on particular points of interests and battles, is there not a map or illustration for every major event? For pages and pages, the Nevsky Bridgehead is described, but not one illustration or picture or depiction of what it looked like or how the troops of both sides were situated is displayed. I really dislike when illustrations are not used. I will concede that that there are two maps that describe many of the relationships of the cities and towns, however, not all of the cities and towns discussed in the book are on the maps - dumb. Additionally, I was very disappointed in the failure to give the German side of the story with any detail. What were the soldiers thinking at the Bridgehead? We do get some information about the German decisions as they moved into position, but not enough first person accounts. After all, this is about the Leningrad Siege - it should be researched from both accounts, not just the Russian side. Michael Jones considers himself a specialist in military history, but I found the first 125 pages to be the slowest of the book as he was unwinding the opening surge and set up of German forces. At about page 125, he begins to get into the Russia people and their diaries. This is the fascinating part of the book for me. The stories of the people are heartbreaking and soul searching and then heartwarming. But even in this section, he skips around chronologically when that should not be necessary. It breaks the flow of the story and it is not necessary in this type of book. Again, there were moments of truly terrific writing by Jones - i.e. the setup and telling of the 7th Symphony. But after these couple of chapters, Jones again gets into more military work with the breakup of the defenses of the Germans. This is necessary, but the way in which it was told broke up the flow of the story. In the middle of the bombardment of the Germans, Jones takes two paragraphs to tell a story about a little boy named Davidov, who was picked on by some bullies - why? With all of the stories to be told, this was a strange inclusion. I'm glad that I took the time to read about the Siege, but I'm afraid that this is just not the perfect book on this historic event. It just doesn't have enough information and detail of what was going on in both the German and Soviet headquarters. We went from everyone dying of starvation to the Red Army breaking out with more artillery and shells and people than they ever had in a battle. We saw nothing about the build up. There was just too much detail unaccounted. The thought process is missing. Jones was somewhat successful in his approach to find the underlying hope of the people but he extended the reach of the book to include military information and I felt that he failed at this. This rendition of Leningrad's Siege just left me unsatisfied. 29 of 34 people found the following review helpful: 2.0 out of 5 stars A Shallow and Derivative Effort, By This review is from: Leningrad: State of Siege (Hardcover) The siege of Leningrad was first dealt with comprehensively by Harrison Salisbury's The 900 Days in 1969 and further detailed by David Glantz's The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944 in 2002. British historian Michael Jones builds upon these earlier works, as well as interviews he conducted with survivors of the siege in order to write Leningrad: State of Siege. Jones' book is narrowly focused on the worst period of the siege during November 1941 to March 1942. The authors' main focus is on the human horror and tragedy occurring within the city, where tens of thousands were starving to death each month, although he does reserve some space to discuss the futile defense of the Nevskaya Dubrovka bridgehead. Jones style is to depict the `psychological aspect' of battle - what motivated the city's population to hold out under severe duress. Unfortunately, this book is written in a very shallow style that doesn't go much beyond unconnected interviews with survivors and the better parts of the book are derived almost in toto from Salisbury and Glantz. Too much of the book is written in a shrill, sensationalist tone and this author does not appear to know the difference between rumors, speculation and historical fact. The author's main tranche of `new' research rests on assertions that their was more cannibalism within the city than previously admitted and that the government nearly lost control of parts of the city in late January 1942 - which is hardly surprising to anyone who has read a few books on this subject. The authors' main hypothesis is that the military and political leadership in Leningrad let the population down and that they could have done more to alleviate suffering and hunger. The two main culprits identified by the author are Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and Andrei Zhdanov (Leningrad Communist party boss). In chapter two, the author begins an all-out assault on Voroshilov (using a crude epithet from Khrushchev) and claims that, "it was Voroshilov's woeful influence in the first vital months of the war that set in place the city's military disaster." Jones' method is broad-brush, personal attacks. Voroshilov's incompetence is accepted ipso facto, not examined. He begins the attack by claiming that, "Voroshilov was focus[ed] on constructing one line of defense, along the Luga River, seventy miles from Leningrad," but fails to note that this was ordered by General Popov - never mentioned by name in the book - and that construction was also begun on fortified areas closer to Leningrad. Reading David Glantz, there is little doubt that the dogged defense of the Luga Line and these other fortified areas bought vital time for Leningrad. Jones claims that Voroshilov's commitment of untrained militia divisions was a `senseless sacrifice' but these units were not wiped out as he claimed and they played a vital role in saving Leningrad. The author proceeds to lay every single defect of the Red Army at Voroshilov's feet, as if he were solely responsible for the German ability to reach Leningrad. This is not to say that Voroshilov was a great general or minister of defense - he wasn't - but attacks of this sort are too simplistic to explain a complex event. The author then moves on to attack Zhdanov, who is accused of `doing nothing,' of organizing `black market food deals,' or `gorging himself while the city starved,' etc. This interpretation is 180 degrees off from that provided by Salisbury, who did his homework a lot better than this author. It is a matter of historical fact that Zhdanov organized the militia and the Road of Life, both of which made major contributions to saving the city. Many of the attacks on Zhdanov are of the `he was a pig' sort, asserted by people who were 20 or just children during the siege; it is doubtful that these people ever met him. The author never mentions the Leningrad Military Council (LMC) and he is under the mistaken impression that Zhdanov was directing military operations. Amazingly, Soviet military leaders who played critical roles in the siege - Khozin, Fediuninskiy and Meretskov - are mentioned only once in the entire book. The author makes ridiculous claims that all of Leningrad's food was destroyed in the Badaev warehouse fire (more like 5 percent) and blames Zhdanov for stupidly storing it all in one place - which simply wasn't true. He also blames Voroshilov and Zhdanov for `panicking' and deciding to scuttle the Baltic Fleet (this was a direct order from Stalin) and claims Zhukov was the one who began using the fleet for naval gunfire support, but this actually began under Voroshilov. Indeed, many of the author's accusations are unfounded and based more on rumor and innuendo. The author does acknowledge Soviet success in creating the `Road of Life' across frozen Lake Ladoga - giving no credit to Zhdanov - but provides much less data than appeared in Salisbury or Glantz. He completely ignores the problem of the Osinevets-Leningrad railroad which brought food into Leningrad and suggests that a great deal of food was withheld from ordinary people and reserved for the Communist party elite. Although there was certainly corruption in the pipeline, the author fails to realize that the city needed over 1,000 tons of food per day but the road was not capable of delivering this much food until late February 1942, by which point thousands had starved. On page 195, the author boldly states that, "much, much more could have been done by Leningrad's authorities." Like what? An immense amount was achieved at great cost in life to keep Leningrad going and glib assertions that try to wish away the whole siege are just nonsense. Share your thoughts with other customers: Create your own review | |
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